Email Security - Review

Email Security - Review

I thought I had this all shut up nice and tight

Received email from garbage source - the usual click bait

Threw it at a few forensic tools and AI - here is the result - if you use any sort of email, you can usually get access to the header information by viewing the original message.

Here’s a structured breakdown of what your header is showing and what it means for sender identity and your mail security posture:


🕵️ Who is it really from?

  • Claimed sender:
    "braedach.com IT Admin" <your-smtp-email@domain.com>
    This is suspicious because the visible “From” address (domain.com) does not match the authenticated sending domain (braedach.com).
  • Authenticated path:
    • The message was sent through Mailgun infrastructure (pc232-48.mailgun.net, IP 143.55.232.48).
    • SPF (Sender Policy Framework) passed for braedach.com because Mailgun is authorized to send for that domain.
    • DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) passed for braedach.com.
    • However, DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance) failed because the visible “From” domain (domain.com) does not align with the authenticated domain (braedach.com).
  • Bottom line:
    The email was actually sent via Mailgun on behalf of braedach.com, but the “From” header was spoofed to show domain.com. That mismatch is why DMARC failed.

⚠️ Weaknesses / Red flags

  1. DMARC failure
    • The sending domain (domain.com) has no DMARC enforcement (p=NONE).
    • This allows attackers to spoof domain.com without being rejected.
    • Gmail flagged this mismatch but still delivered the message.
  2. Misleading “From” address
    • The real authenticated sender is braedach.com (via Mailgun).
    • The visible “From” (domain.com) is misleading. This is a classic phishing tactic.
  3. Suspicious relay chain
    • The header shows hops through sav-orblco.com and IPs like 91.92.242.113 and 178.16.53.136, which don’t align with either braedach.com or domain.com.
    • This suggests the message may have originated from a compromised host or was relayed through shady infrastructure.
  4. Urgent subject line
    • “IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED: Mailbox Notification Alert” is a common phishing lure.

✅ What this means for your security

  • Your Gmail account itself wasn’t breached — Gmail correctly validated SPF/DKIM and flagged DMARC misalignment.
  • The weakness lies in the sending domain (domain.com) not enforcing DMARC. That allows bad actors to spoof it.
  • Since the message passed SPF/DKIM for braedach.com, it’s possible that Mailgun was abused (via a compromised account or misconfigured relay) to send this phishing attempt.

🔒 Recommendations

  • Do not click links or open attachments from this message.
  • Report it as phishing in Gmail — this helps train filters.
  • If you control domain.com or braedach.com:
    • Enforce DMARC with p=reject once SPF/DKIM are aligned.
    • Audit Mailgun API keys and sending logs for abuse.
  • As a recipient, you don’t need to change your Gmail security settings — Gmail already caught the DMARC failure.
  • Stay alert for similar “urgent mailbox” messages — they’re almost always phishing.

🌐 Email Flow (Simplified Diagram)

Here’s the journey of that suspicious message:

[Attacker system: 91.92.242.113]
        │
        ▼
[Relay: mail.sav-orblco.com]
        │
        ▼
[Mailgun server: pc232-48.mailgun.net (143.55.232.48)]
   - SPF: PASS for braedach.com
   - DKIM: PASS for braedach.com
   - From header CLAIMS: domain.com (spoofed)
        │
        ▼
[Gmail MX]
   - SPF: PASS (braedach.com)
   - DKIM: PASS (braedach.com)
   - DMARC: FAIL (domain.com has no enforcement)
        │
        ▼
[Your inbox: mybloody@email.address.tld]

Key point: The attacker injected a misleading “From: domain.com” header, but the actual authenticated sender was braedach.com via Mailgun. Gmail caught the DMARC misalignment but still delivered it because domain.com has no DMARC enforcement.


The email came from this host - so now you know.

Cybersecurity Search Engine | Criminal IP

✅ Summary

  • The spoof worked because domain.com has no DMARC
  • For your own domain (braedach.com), is correctly configured
  • Using a dedicated subdomain for Mailgun (mg.braedach.com) is best practice.

Reviewing all the above - again

#enoughsaid