Venezuela - Interesting

Interesting times. I needed a fact check and some information

1. What actually happened in Venezuela

Basic sequence:

• U.S. military buildup: For months, the U.S. positioned the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford and other warships in the Caribbean, carried out live‑fire exercises, and seized vessels it said were smuggling drugs from Venezuela. CBS News
• Airstrikes: In the early hours of 3 January 2026 (Venezuelan time), a series of explosions hit Caracas and other states (Miranda, Aragua, La Guaira). Witnesses reported low‑flying aircraft and smoke from military facilities. CBS News Sky News
• Targets: The U.S. described the strikes as hitting drug‑related and strategic/military infrastructure; Venezuelan officials claimed some civilian sites were also struck. CBS News ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
• Capture of Maduro: U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores were “captured and flown out of the country” following the strikes. CBS News ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) Sky News
• Who carried it out: U.S. officials told media that the operation to seize Maduro was conducted by Delta Force, an elite U.S. Army special operations unit previously involved in high‑risk missions like the operation against ISIS leader Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi. CBS News Firstpost
• Venezuelan response: Venezuela declared a national emergency, denounced the operation as imperialist aggression, and said it did not know Maduro’s whereabouts, demanding proof of life. ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) Sky News

So this was not “U.S. Marshals knocking on the door.” It was a combined air campaign plus special forces raid on the territory of another state to seize its de facto leader. CBS News ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) Sky News

2. Was Maduro “legitimately elected”?

This is where law and politics get fused.

2.1 What the U.S. and many others say

• Maduro faced widespread accusations of electoral fraud, particularly in the 2024 election, which international monitors and the UN have linked to repression and irregularities. ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
• The U.S. had already refused to recognise Maduro as the legitimate president after those elections and recognised opposition figures instead (this began years earlier and carried through 2024). ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
• Caracas‑based journalist Helena Carpio told the ABC that international monitors and the UN consider Maduro to have “lost the election in 2024.” ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)

So: in the eyes of the U.S. and many Western/Latin American governments, Maduro was not a legitimate democratic leader but an authoritarian ruler who manipulated elections. ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)

2.2 But under Venezuelan internal structures

Inside Venezuela:

• Maduro still controlled the state apparatus: military, intelligence, security forces, electoral authorities, courts.
• He was still treated by his own institutions (and some foreign states) as the incumbent president.

So you effectively had a legally dual reality:

• Internationally (for some states): “Maduro is a usurper; the real mandate lies with the opposition.”
• Domestically (in practice): “Maduro is in charge, regardless of how he got there.”

Recognition of “legitimacy” is a political act; it doesn’t physically remove someone from power. But it becomes the anchor for how other states rationalise what they do next.

3. What legal basis did the U.S. claim?

This is crucial: the U.S. did not say, “We’re enforcing an international arrest warrant.”

3.1 U.S. criminal indictments

• In March 2020, Maduro was indicted in U.S. federal court on charges including narco‑terrorism, conspiracy to import cocaine to the U.S., and weapons offences. ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
• The U.S. accused him of leading the “Cartel de los Soles,” coordinating cocaine shipments with FARC (a designated terrorist organisation), moving weapons, and training militias tied to the cartel. ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
• The U.S. had offered a reward of up to tens of millions of dollars for information leading to his capture. CBS News ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)

So, in U.S. law, Maduro was not just a foreign leader, he was a wanted criminal defendant.

3.2 U.S. constitutional justification (Article II)

Republican Senator Mike Lee (and other figures) described the operation as grounded in:

• The president’s “inherent authority under Article II of the Constitution to protect U.S. personnel from an actual or imminent attack.” CBS News

This is the same type of domestic legal logic often invoked for:

• Counter‑terrorism strikes
• Operations against foreign armed groups
• Some unilateral use‑of‑force decisions

It is a U.S. domestic law rationale, not an international one.

3.3 “In conjunction with U.S. law enforcement”

Trump publicly said the operation was:

“done in conjunction with U.S. Law Enforcement.” Sky News

That framing matters:

• It casts the mission as a law enforcement–style apprehension of a fugitive who happens to be in another country.
• It downplays the idea that this was a traditional war.

So the U.S. legal story is:

“We are not kidnapping a head of state. We are arresting a foreign criminal under our laws, who happens to be a non‑recognised ruler.”

4. Why this is not about international arrest warrants

You’re absolutely right that international law “arrest warrants” aren’t in play here.

4.1 What an international arrest warrant would involve

A truly international arrest process (e.g. via the International Criminal Court) would roughly require:

• An international court with jurisdiction over the alleged crimes.
• The defendant’s state (or a state where they are found) to be bound by that court’s statute or to have accepted its jurisdiction.
• Arrest and transfer executed by cooperating states, not by foreign forces storming another country.

None of that is present here:

• Venezuela is not a party to the ICC Rome Statute.
• The United States is also not a party to the ICC.
• No international tribunal has issued a warrant for Maduro.
• No multilateral authorisation (like a UN Security Council resolution) exists for armed intervention.

4.2 What actually happened instead

Instead of international law, the U.S. used:

• Its own criminal indictments (U.S. domestic courts).
• Its own executive power (Article II authority).
• Its own military assets (strikes and special forces). CBS News ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) Sky News

From an international‑law perspective, that means:

• This was not a neutral “legal arrest” in the sense of a multilateral police action.
• It was a unilateral use of force on another state’s territory to seize a person.

That’s why Russia called it an “act of armed aggression” and took it to the UN Security Council – because, in the language of the UN Charter, cross‑border force without consent is presumptively illegal unless justified as self‑defence or authorised by the Security Council. Sky News

5. Sovereignty and the UN Charter: how does this fit?

5.1 International law baseline

Under the UN Charter:

• States must refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (Article 2(4)).
• Force is lawful only if:
  • Self‑defence against an armed attack (Article 51), or
  • UN Security Council authorisation, or
  • Consent of the territorial state.

Here:

• There is no UN authorisation.
• Venezuela clearly did not consent.
• The U.S. notion of “self‑defence” is based on drug trafficking and alleged links to terrorist organisations, which is highly contested as a legal ground for a full‑scale strike on state territory.

So, in strict UN‑Charter terms, many international lawyers would argue this looks like a violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty and illegal use of force, regardless of the criminal allegations.

5.2 The U.S. counter‑narrative

The U.S. implicitly leans on two ideas:

1. Maduro is not a legitimate government, so the “sovereignty” shield is weaker or inapplicable.
2. Narco‑terrorism plus imminent threat to U.S. personnel create a form of extended self‑defence that justifies limited force.

Those are politically powerful arguments inside the U.S., but legally controversial internationally.

6. Historical parallels

This operation sits in a line of previous cases where the U.S. used force to target foreign leaders or high‑ranking figures, sometimes combining criminal and security rationales.

6.1 Manuel Noriega (Panama, 1989)

• Noriega was Panama’s de facto ruler.
• He was indicted in U.S. courts for drug trafficking.
• The U.S. launched Operation Just Cause, invading Panama, killing hundreds (possibly thousands), and capturing Noriega.
• He was then tried in a U.S. court as a common criminal.

Parallels:

• Indicted foreign leader accused of drug trafficking.
• Non‑recognised regime from the U.S. perspective.
• Use of force to seize him and bring him to trial.

6.2 Saddam Hussein (Iraq, 2003)

Regime change via full‑scale war, later capture and trial.

• Justification framed more in terms of WMD and UN resolutions, less as a straight “law enforcement capture,” but still a unilateral use of overwhelming force with contested legality.

6.3 Osama bin Laden (Pakistan, 2011)

• Non‑state actor, not a head of state.
• U.S. special forces entered Pakistan without consent to kill/capture him.
• Justified as self‑defence after 9/11.

Parallels with Maduro:

• Unilateral cross‑border raid.
• No prior consent of the territorial state.

The Maduro operation is closest to Noriega: a hybrid of warlike force and criminal enforcement, focused on a leader the U.S. had criminally indicted and politically de‑recognised.

7. Ramifications for any leader with an arrest warrant or indictment

This is the “box and dice” of what you pointed to: precedent and signal.

7.1 If this becomes an accepted practice, it implies:

• Recognition as leverage: If a powerful state decides another government is “illegitimate,” it may feel freer to use force against that leadership without accepting the usual sovereignty constraints.
• Domestic courts as foreign policy tools: Indictments from a major power’s own courts can become pretexts for cross‑border operations.
• Erosion of the head‑of‑state immunity norm: Traditionally, sitting heads of state enjoy strong immunity from foreign jurisdiction. If you deny their legitimacy, you also deny their immunity.

7.2 Does it mean “any leader with a warrant is fair game”?

Not automatically, but it opens the conceptual door:

• If country A indicts a foreign leader in its own courts,
• And country A declares that leader “illegitimate”,
• And country A has the power projection to act,
• Then country A may decide it has the right to seize that leader by force.

Applied generically, that logic is not limited to the U.S.; other powers could mimic it. For example:

• A major state could label a foreign leader a “terrorist” or “criminal,” indict them at home, and then claim a similar right to strike.

That’s why many observers see this as dangerous: it normalises the fusion of domestic criminal law and extraterritorial military force.

8. Could other powers copy this?

8.1 Russia, China, and others

In theory:

• Russia could claim a Ukrainian, Baltic, or other leader is a “criminal” under Russian law and try to justify operations on that basis.
• China could make similar claims about leaders it accuses of “separatism” or “terrorism.”

The practical constraint is capability and risk:

• Do they have the ability to execute such an operation?
• Are they willing to accept the geopolitical blowback?

But the normative barrier — “you just cannot do that” — is weakened every time a major power does it and survives the diplomatic fallout.

9. What this does to the idea of international law

9.1 Law on paper vs power in practice

On paper:

• International law still says you cannot use force on another state’s territory without consent, self‑defence, or UN authorisation.
• Heads of state generally have robust immunity from foreign prosecution while in office.

In practice:

• A superpower can re‑label a foreign incumbent as an illegitimate criminal, rely on its own legal system, and use force anyway.
• The “law” that matters becomes:
  • Its own domestic law (indictments, constitutional powers), plus
  • Its capacity to withstand international criticism and retaliation.

So the message to other leaders is:

“If you are powerful and recognised, international law protects you more strongly.
If you are weak, isolated, and de‑recognised, your formal status as ‘president’ may not save you.”

9.2 Why this is described as “without modern precedent”

Sky News called it “an event without modern precedent” because you have all of these in one operation:

• A sitting (de facto) head of state,
• In his own capital,
• Captured in a foreign air–ground operation,
• Justified not by a UN mandate or international court, but by one country’s domestic indictments and political non‑recognition. Sky News

That combination is rare and deeply unsettling for the traditional notion of sovereignty.

10. Where this could go next (for Venezuela and globally)

10.1 Inside Venezuela

Possible developments (some already hinted in coverage):

• Power vacuum or transition: Opposition figures, military factions, or ruling‑party insiders may compete for control.
• Armed resistance: The national emergency decree called for “armed struggle” against “imperialist aggression,” which could mean insurgency or repression cycles. Sky News
• Fragmentation: Regions, armed groups, or cartel‑linked actors could assert more autonomy.

10.2 Globally

Potential medium‑term effects:

• More contested norms: The line between lawful self‑defence and unlawful aggression becomes even fuzzier.
• Increased strategic hedging: Smaller states may seek stronger alliances with major powers (U.S., China, Russia) as a shield.
• More politicisation of recognition: Governments might become more cautious about who they recognise, knowing recognition can be weaponised both for and against them.

There is a lot more going on here than meets the eye. Wait and see.

#enougsaid